The paper argues that Mercosur countries have to pursue monetary integration if they intend to save their custom union and further deepen economic integration. These countries have two options: a decentralized monetary union (MU), whereby each member country either pegs to the U.S. dollar or dollarizes outright; or a centralized MU with its own currency, its own central bank, and the adoption of common minimum financial standards. A centralized MU is preferable to a decentralized one, although it is more complex and involves significant institution building. Under ideal conditions, a centralized MU should be preceded by a long transition period to allow member countries to give independence to their national central banks and pursue inflation targeting, while adjusting to idiosyncratic shocks. However, Argentina is in such a disarray that the adoption of a credible inflation-targeting strategy would be purely wishful thinking. Thus, we recommend an accelerated MU with an immediate "realization" (i.e., the Brazilian currency) of the Argentine economy, followed by institution building in Mercosur.
Since custom union became a reality in the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) in 1995, intra-regional trade has gained momentum. However, further integration has been hampered by uncoordinated monetary policy: exchange rate turmoil and competitive devaluations have wreaked havoc in the region. Mercosur needs a long-term monetary strategy. It is not enough for each of the Mercosur countries to aim for a non-inflationary environment; they need to coordinate their monetary arrangement so as to further integrate with one another and boost the pace of their economic activity. The strategy of a monetary union (MU) in Mercosur, thus, must serve two purposes simultaneously: it must give each member country a monetary environment that delivers low and predictable inflation rates, but it must also promote economic and possibly political integration in the area.
One objection to our starting point is that Mercosur is not an optimal currency area (Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999) and that the search for monetary unification puts the cart before the horse; another objection is that there is no political will to sustain such an ambitious program. The first objection applied just as well to the European Monetary Union (EMU). In fact, very few economists concluded that EMU was an optimal currency union at the time the Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991; and even less so when the European Economic Community reached the status of a customs union in 1968. We could go further and push this idea at the country level. Was Italy an optimal currency area when it became a monetary union in 1861? Was Italy an optimal currency area one hundred years later or at the time of the Maasstricht treaty? Based exclusively on the labor mobility criterion of optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961) , Italy would have failed the test. The argument could be extended to other parts of the world that have functioned reasonably well under one currency. Krugman (1993 p. 22 ) raised the bar on this discussion when he asserted that: "…we have no 3 reason to suppose that the United States defines an optimum currency area." The point is that the requirements for having a single money developed by the optimal currency literature are so demanding as to call into question many existing currency areas.
The second objection -the lack of political will to create a full-fledged MU-is much more serious than the first. However, cooperation is an acquired taste; cooperation must start somewhere before it expands into other areas. In sum, our basic premise is that the Mercosur countries want to further integrate with one another to raise their standards of living; a strategy of monetary unification would not only deliver low and predictable inflation rates but would act as a catalyst for further integration as well (Eichengreen, 1998) . MU, in this scenario, becomes an agent of change rather than being the final act of economic and financial integration.
I. Lessons from EMU
Back in the 1970s a debate emerged in Europe as to the best strategy to achieve monetary unification. Two schools of thought stood against each other: the economist school identified with Karl Schiller, the West German Economics and Finance Minister, and the monetarist school identified with Raymond Barre, later to become the Prime Minister of France (Swann, 1988 pp. 180-82) . The debate continued, with varying intensity, all the way to the Maastricht treaty of 1991. According to the economist school, MU had to come at the end of a long and deep process of economic integration; a single money was the prize, or "coronation," for having achieved economic convergence. According to the monetarist school, MU would achieve more than a reduction of transaction costs and the elimination of exchange-rate uncertainty; it would give a boost to the very process of economic integration and 4 convergence. This debate is as relevant for today's Mercosur as it was in the early days of the process of monetary unification in the European Community. Is economic integration independent of monetary integration? Can monetary integration enhance economic integration?
Before EMU, there was general acceptance that MU would not generate anything comparable to the net benefits of economic integration (Krugman, 1993; Fratianni, 1994) . The creation of EMU and the speculative attacks of the 1990's gave us new insights on MUs. The first is that MUs can occur in the absence of political union or before political union. Before EMU, received wisdom had it that political unification must precede monetary unification; EMU is a big exception to the rule. We now accept that, though political union is not a precondition, MU may actually facilitate its achievement. This is in accordance with the principle of the "cumulative logic of integration" (Tsoukalis 1977 ); more on this below.
The second insight is that monetary integration consolidates the net benefits of economic integration. According to the literature on the "endogeneity of the optimum currency areas" started by Frankel and Rose (1998) , monetary unification enhances economic integration through increased transparency of prices, more predictable costs, increased reliance on long-term contracts resulting from having eliminated sudden changes in real exchange rates, and ultimately, more intense cross-border intra-firm and intra-industry flows (von Furstenberg, 2002a) . All of this leads to shocks becoming more symmetric in a monetary union. The same factors may be responsible for the finding that the impact of MU on trade flows is so much larger than the impact of fixed exchange rates (Rose, 2000) .
The third insight is that currencies of small open economies are uncompetitive in relation to the currencies of large and stable economies. On the one hand, these small 5 currencies provide little usefulness to their holders because global factors such as ecommerce, regional economic integration, and global liberalization have eroded their monopoly power (von Furstenberg, 2002b) . On the other hand, these currencies are prone to speculative attacks, especially when they serve economies with fragile banking systems. The vast majority of new entrants in the global marketplace have undeveloped financial structures, poor legal, accounting and regulatory frameworks, inadequate supervisory methods and staffing, and a history of political interference, favoritism and cronyism. The financial weaknesses thus created raised the prospect of the transmission of more frequent local failures to the international financial system. Claims of financial contagion were made in connection with the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, the Asian crisis of 1997, and the Russian crisis of 1998.
The fourth insight comes from the consequences of adopting a common central bank and a common financial regulator (Stockman, 2001) . The assumption here is that, unlike in the EMU, the common central bank is also the financial regulator and supervisor; as such, the common central bank (CB) impacts on the money and finance industry as a rule maker (e.g., through capital requirements and the institution of a bank deposit insurance). With countries experiencing differences in real shocks or differences in economic structures, separate CBs can address these shocks better than a common CB. This result is in sympathy with the macro stabilization result that asymmetric shocks are best handled by separate CBs operating under a flexible exchange rate regime. But how should one push this concept? Stockman appeals to the law of large numbers to pool risk to reverse the traditional macro proposition. As currency areas become larger, asymmetric shocks to individual regions are internalized within the expanded area. Financial markets can redirect funds from one area to another, lessening the need for lending of last resort by the common central bank. It follows that "the more 6 asymmetric certain real shocks, the greater the benefits of a common currency and Central Bank. In contrast, when two countries experience similar real shocks, the chance is smaller than one country, but not the other, will experience a system-wide banking crisis that requires a lender-of-last-resort response under separate central banks that could be avoided under a single central bank." (p. 663).
In sum, the new insights on MU emphasize the reduced usefulness of separate monies in small open economies and the positive impact of financial intermediation on economic growth. Also, MU may strengthen the financial system through the adoption of minimum standards and strong supervisory activity and consequently achieve higher benefits than those obtained by standard macroeconomic stability.
II. Decentralized vs. Centralized Forms of Monetary Union
Having argued that monetary unification must also serve the purpose of promoting economic integration in Mercosur, the remainder of the paper dwells on how best to reach MU. To remain in the spirit of the debate between economists and monetarists, we present two scenarios: a monetarist-inspired decentralized MU and an economist-inspired centralized system.
A. Decentralized Monetary Unification
The first scenario envisions a system of decentralized policy coordination with fixed exchange rates or unilateral dollarization. We focus on the effects of the exchange rate regimes on inflation; as a way to organize our discussion, we measure the gains in inflation resulting from a given regime by the difference between domestic and foreign market rates of interest, which we write as follows:
where i = yield to maturity of a security issued by the home government and denominated in domestic currency, i f = yield to maturity of a security with similar characteristics issued by the home government and denominated in foreign currency (say U.S. dollar), and i* = yield to maturity of a security with similar characteristics issued by the foreign government and denominated in foreign currency. The first term on the right-hand side of (1), i t -i t f , imbeds the expected depreciation of the home currency with respect to the foreign currency; we shall refer to it as currency risk. The second term, i t f -i t *, imbeds the expected difference between the default risk of the home security and the foreign security as well as the expected value of future changes in the characteristics of the home security; we shall refer to it as country risk (Marston 1995, p. 43) . Proponents of the hard peg expect a sharp drop in the interest rate differential. They also expect that harder exchange rate regimes would insulate economies from external interest rate shocks better than looser exchange rate regimes. Frankel (1999 p.19 ), for example, shows that the impact of a change in the U.S. federal funds rate on Panamanian deposit rate is considerably smaller than on the Argentine money market rate, and even smaller than on the Mexican money market rate. Furthermore, estimated size of the impact in each country and their respective standard errors appear to be positively related. Frankel interprets his results (p. 20) as suggesting that country risk is positively correlated with currency risk.
One way in which the hard peg can lower permanently country risk is for monetary discipline to translate into fiscal discipline. If governments feel constrained by the hard peg, deficits will be lower, on average, in countries adopting a hard peg in relation to countries adopting flexible exchange rates.
A currency board hardens the hard peg by eliminating discretionary monetary policy.
In its pure form, a currency board requires that R H. Changes in t he monetary base can only occur through changes in the foreign component of the monetary base, that is through a surplus or deficits in the sum of the current-account and capital-account balances. The currency board cannot act on the domestic component of the monetary base to inject or subtract liquidity from the money market. Consequently, it cannot be a lender of last resort unless R exceeds H. The tighter constraints implied by a currency board relative to a hard peg translate into added benefits in terms of a lower currency risk and thus lower interest rate differentials (for more details, see Carrera, this volume).
Under "dollarization" a country adopts a foreign currency as its exclusive legal tender.
This regime has a very high exit cost and hence a high degree of credibility. Currency risk, measured with reference to the adopted currency, disappears altogether. On the other hand, dollarization, in the absence of an explicit agreement, implies a loss of seigniorage, lender-oflast resort facility, and the political symbol attached to the national currency. These are not small losses (Krugman, 1993 p. 20 ).
An unsettled point is the effect of dollarization on country risk. Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) argue that, theoretically, the elimination of currency risk impacts on country risk in several and opposing ways, so that it is difficult to trace a dominant direction of causality. Among the factors responsible to raise country risk, we list the abolishment of the inflation tax, depriving governments with notoriously weak tax collection systems of a source of tax revenues; the impossibility of reducing the real value of debt through inflation; the increase in output volatility resulting from a steepening of the aggregate supply curve; and the negative impact on portfolio diversification due to the disappearance of an asset in a world of imperfect asset substitutability. It is possible that the reduced portfolio may have a higher risk. Among the factors responsible to reduce the country risk premium, we list the disappearance of speculative attacks, the elimination of currency mismatches as a source of bank crises, and the deepening of capital market integration. Using event study methodology with data from EMS and Latin American countries, Powell and Sturzenegger find inconclusive results on the direction of causality from currency risk to country risk. This evidence is consistent with that presented by Edwards (2001 Tables 2 and 3 ) who finds that dollarized economies perform better than non-dollarized economies in terms of inflation but not in terms of fiscal discipline.
In sum, of the three decentralized regimes, the hard peg has the lowest credibility to the exchange rate commitment and the highest interest rate spread; dollarization the highest credibility and the lowest interest rate spread. Currency risk tends to be positive under hard pegs and currency boards and zero under dollarization. Less clear-cut is the impact of the exchange rate regime on country risk. On the one hand, the hardening of the peg makes it more difficult for the government to extract additional seigniorage. To the extent that the government feels committed to the hard peg or to the currency board, it will feel constrained not to monetize budget deficits; deficits will fall and so will the stock of government debt. But such a constraint can also be engineered with flexible exchange rates and an independent central bank committed to price stability. If government, on the other hand, is unwilling to accept fiscal discipline, it may be as likely to jettison the hard peg or currency board as to undermine central bank independence under floating. It is tempting to argue that currency risk and country risk are positively correlated. While they appear to be during currency crises, the evidence so far remains inconclusive. The data, also, do not confirm that dollarized countries are more fiscally responsible than non-dollarized countries.
B. Centralized Monetary Union
The second scenario envisions Mercosur countries adopting a full-fledged MU, with a single central bank, a common currency, and common financial regulation. This is much more complex than a decentralized MU. It requires a strong motivation on the part of the prospective member countries to integrate laws, institutions, operating protocols and systems, and other elements of the administrative infrastructure for economics and finance. This desire need not be strong at the start of the process; it develops as cooperation in one field opens possibilities for cooperation elsewhere. Integration has its own internal dynamics and its full benefits are perceived as time goes on, in a sort of learning-by-doing process. Unlike decentralized MUs, centralized unions make large investments in institution building. Common institutions evolve so slowly that we take them as exogenous in the short and medium run. But common institutions leave a permanent mark on the integration process. It is not enough to believe that integration is a positive-sum game; someone must create a process through which means are directed at ends. With common institutions, integration is linked to the incentives of those people who oversee and implement integration policies and derive power and prestige from an expansion of these policies (Tsoukalis, 1977 pp. 22-28) . In the European Union (EU), for example, the European Commission has been a catalyst of integration. Those who work in the Commission are not neutral with respect to the enlargement of the integration policy areas.
A currency union -e.g., a dollarized regime -does not incur the cost of launching and establishing a common currency; nor does it bear the other cost of building a reputable common central bank. But a centralized MU enjoys the flexibility of counteracting unionwide shocks, while empowering member countries in the conduct of the common monetary policy; neither one is present in a dollarized economy.
A monetary union enhances liquidity and price transparency through lower information and transaction costs; integrates financial markets through the formation of regional exchanges of bonds and equities and cross-border banking; and raises efficiency through economies of scale and scope in the financial industry. In essence, a monetary union raises the degree of financial depth and completeness and, consequently, facilitates consumption insurance arising from idiosyncratic shocks. As von Furstenberg (2002a p. 9) puts it: "…countries might be more willing to finance large current account deficits for each other once they have joined in monetary union." But is this true regardless of whether the MU is in the form of a dollarized regime or centralized union?
Three fundamental aspects differentiate a currency union (e.g., dollarization) from a centralized MU. The first is that in a centralized union a positive interaction takes place between the efficiency and reputation of the common currency and financial depth (Rey, 1997; Fratianni, Hauskrecht and Maccario, 1998) . The source of the efficiency gain resides in the degree of competitiveness and completeness of financial markets. MU promotes financial integration. As regional markets replace national markets, depth and liquidity improve. More intense competition reduces bid and ask spreads on asset prices, making it more attractive for global investors to transact in assets denominated in the new currency. To what extent the new currency becomes also an international currency depends critically on the quality of 13 monetary policy of the centralized union. A low-inflation record and a strong status of central bank independence are at heart of the reputation of the common central bank and common currency. In turn, a more reputable currency promotes additional financial integration. Under dollarization, the gains of financial integration accrue to the external currency. Should that currency become mismanaged, MU will suffer from it. Under a centralized union, the gains of financial integration accrue to the union's currency.
The second difference is that a monetary union can reduce or eliminate the effects of a common or union-wide shock, leaving each member with its own idiosyncratic disturbance.
Being unsystematic, these country disturbances can be diversified away within the union, a point emphasized by von Furstenberg (2002a). In contrast, under dollarization, monetary policy is more likely to be targeted to aggregate shocks affecting the currency home country than to aggregate shocks affecting the dollar area. This is because citizens of the home country, unlike citizens outside the home country but inside the dollar area, vote.
The third difference is that a centralized MU spurs additional forms of cooperation, from common financial standards to tax-based insurance arrangements. The cumulative principle of cooperation suggests that successful cooperation in some areas creates opportunities and incentives for cooperation in other areas. Take, for example, the issue of the union adjusting to a persistent current-account deficit under the assumption that the union's monetary policy aims at maintaining a low rate of inflation while fiscal policy remains under the control of each member government. In the absence of a specified rule, what member country might want to undertake a reduction in its own budget deficit for the benefit of the union as a whole? The obvious lesson is that a centralized MU raises the issue and creates an opportunity to establish a more complex mechanism of coordinated fiscal policies.
14 A significant advantage of centralized MUs is that member countries participate in an implicit insurance arrangement: temporary excesses of consumption over production can be financed more easily than under the alternative of a no-MU regime. The current-account deficits of Pennsylvania or Ohio have much less of an economic and policy significance than the current-account deficit of Canada. This is for two reasons. The first is that MU enhances the completeness and integration of financial markets and, thus, relaxes the force of the external budget constraint (von Furstenberg, 2001a ). The second is that MUs tend to become also fiscal unions and imbed some degree of fiscal insurance (Kenen, 1969) . For example, regional idiosyncratic shocks within Canada or the United States prompt income redistribution through rules of tax sharing collected at the federal level or through transfers across regions. Thus, regions that suffer from a negative shock can maintain a consumption level higher than their production level by importing "government capital" from regions that have been spared by the same shock.
With integrated financial markets, national differences in regulation create more opportunities for regulation avoidance, regulation arbitrage, and risk of erosion of regulatory standards. The approach adopted by the EMU (and the EU more broadly) is that national regulators retain the right and obligations of financial regulation and that national financial standards are mutually recognized subject to common floor requirements. The alternative is for the centralized MU to have a common regulatory framework. The difference between the two approaches has more to do with transition strategies than ultimate objectives.
Agreements on minimum common standards are easier to obtain than agreements about a uniform standard. Once regulatory competition among member states reduces drastically differences in national standards, the transition from the principle of mutual recognition to a uniform standard becomes relatively easy to effect.
At the moment, the EMU has centralized the responsibility of monetary policy and the regulation and supervision of the euro payments system; has left to member states other regulations; and left ambiguous others. As a result, the system suffers from unnecessary uncertainty. The application of the lender of last resort is a good example of this uncertainty:
there is no script about the respective roles of the European Central Bank, national central banks, and national regulators and supervisors with respect this function (Goodhart, 2000) .
The lesson for other centralized MUs is that a uniform financial standard may be more suitable than the heterogeneous approach adopted by the EMU. This is the point made in the Lamfalussy Report (2000) . On the other hand, a uniform standard is more costly to obtain.
III. Alternative Strategies for a Centralized MU
In the pursuit of a centralized MU the single most important task for the authorities is to convince the public that they mean what they say (this section draws from Fratianni and von Hagen, 1992 ch. 9). As desirable the goal of a centralized MU may be, unexpected economic disturbances and political events may arise along the way to MU to undermine its desirability.
Here are three possible scenarios: a sudden monetary reform, whereby the Mercosur countries would form immediately a centralized MU; an exchange-rate arrangement similar to the European EMS; and an approach based on independent central banks and inflation targeting.
The main benefit of the sudden monetary reform lies in its speed. A common money would be established quickly, giving no time to lobby against it and no time for economic operators to make adjustments that would undermine MU. Politicians could not renege on MU without incurring the extremely high cost of a monetary secession and the significant burden of reintroducing the national currency. Intra-regional currency risk would disappear; interest rates within MU would only differ by differences in national country risk premia. The most obvious criticism of a sudden monetary reform is that it is politically very costly. Even if the political will existed, it would take months and perhaps years to ratify an agreement of this importance.
The other two scenarios are gradual and give the politician the option of reneging on the centralized MU at a lower cost than in the first scenario; consequently, these strategies are less credible than a sudden monetary reform. On the other hand, gradualism permits individuals and institutions to amortize the adjustment costs over the transition phase. Thus, there is a trade-off between credibility and adjustment costs. To boost their credibility, governments can find ways to signal the seriousness of their commitment to a centralized MU.
In the second scenario, the signal occurs through an exchange-rate regime similar to the EMS. In the European experience the credibility of the exchange-rate regime was relatively low because of the possibility of parity realignments; interest rate differentials imbedded sizable currency risk (country risk was not much of a problem in the EMS). Had realignments been ruled out, the locus of credibility would have shifted to the no-realignment provision. Realignments become more likely as individual member countries face idiosyncratic shocks and domestic goals enter in conflict with the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate regime. It is not obvious that fixing exchange rates during the transition phase raises the quality of the signal. Fixing the exchange rate prematurely may actually deliver the opposite outcome: as long as inflation rates have not fully converged, the fixed rate imposes continuous changes in real exchange rates and, consequently, changes in competitiveness.
Since such an environment is not sustainable in the long run, the public will expect a break down of the fixed exchange rate.
The credibility problem stems from monetary authorities pursuing objectives other than long-run price stability. The signal can be strengthened by restricting the ability of the central bank to trade-off long-run price stability for other objectives. This entails -as in the third scenario--giving independence (from government) to national central banks and rewarding them for delivering long-run price stability. Central bank independence must be buttressed by fiscal rules; persistent and large budget deficits lead inexorably to fiscal dominance and the undoing of central bank independence.
Central bank independence is preferable to a rigid monetary rule because the bank retains enough policy discretion to respond flexibly to real economic shocks. The conservative German Bundesbank, before and during the EMS, was keenly aware of its role of stabilizing short-run output fluctuations without losing sight of long-run price stability (Neumann and von Hagen, 1992) . National idiosyncratic shocks will peter out as the member countries integrate and their inflation rates converge; the length of the transition to a centralized MU will be determined by the convergence of the shocks and national inflation rates.
In sum, there are two credible strategies to arrive at a centralized MU: the radical monetary reform with an "immediate" establishment of a common central bank in Mercosur, or the gradual approach in which the final stage is preceded by a transition with independent national central banks pursuing inflation targeting while adjusting to idiosyncratic shocks. A centralized MU would come about when economic and financial integration would have made shocks sufficiently symmetric in the region and inflation rates would have converged.
The merit of a gradualist strategy is to allow institutions to adjust slowly to the new regime; but this requires that these institutions be sufficiently sturdy to converge to the targeted regime. This premise, unfortunately, appears patently unrealistic for Argentina that has defaulted on its massive debt, put an end to its currency board and is letting the peso float in the exchange markets. Weak institutions and a fragile democracy do not augur well for a gradualist solution. Without a significant reduction in the budget deficits of the central and provincial governments, money growth in Argentina will be propelled by the monetization of those deficits and the country will resume its historical inflationary policies. Under these conditions, it is wishful to think that the Argentine government may grant its central bank full independence and give it a mandate to pursue a low inflation rate policy. 
IV. Conclusions
Mercosur needs a long-term monetary strategy to breathe new life to its struggling customs union. A monetary union in the region may not only deliver a low and predictable inflation rate, but it would also promote economic and perhaps political integration. Mercosur countries face essentially two options: a decentralized MU whereby each member country adopts the U.S. dollar as its currency, or a centralized MU with its own currency, its own central bank, and the adoption of common minimum financial standards. The latter is preferable to the former, although it is more complex and involves significant institution building. On the other hand, a centralized MU enjoys the flexibility of counteracting unionwide shocks and gives member countries a say in the conduct of the common monetary policy; neither feature is present in a dollarized economy. A centralized MU cannot be built overnight: it took 30 years for EMU to become a reality.
Under ideal conditions we prefer a long transition period during which member countries give independence to their national central banks and pursue inflation targeting, while adjusting to idiosyncratic shocks. The final phase would be consummated when economic and financial integration would have made shocks sufficiently symmetric in the region and inflation rates would have converged. However, Argentina is in such a disarray that the adoption of a credible inflation-targeting strategy would be purely wishful thinking.
Thus, we recommend an accelerated MU with an immediate "realization" of the Argentine economy, followed by institution building in Mercosur. Our proposal may appear overly ambitious. Indeed, there is a long list of reasons why none of what we write may ever materialize; we emphasize three.
The first is the most serious: Mercosur countries have weak institutions and democracies. Governments, unstable at home, may find it difficult to embark on a big project to pull this off, and we are not sure whether this exists in the region.
The second objection is that Mercosur is not an optimal currency area and that the search for monetary unification puts the cart before the horse. We have noted that history is replete of MUs being created despite the fact that they did not meet the canons of optimal 22 currency areas. Our view is that a monetary union can be the horse -or at least one of the horses--of the integration cart.
The third objection is that a dollarization of Mercosur would be a superior strategy to the "realization" of Mercosur. This is a serious issue that cannot be resolved immediately. The real suffers from being a local currency. Even if adopted by Mercosur, this currency could not compete with the U.S. dollar and the euro. The competitive disadvantage of the real may well lead to a consolidation of the regional trade arrangements in the North and the South, a grand monetary union of the Americas. For that to occur, not only the smaller countries but the United States as well will have to accept that shared monetary sovereignty is better than national monetary independence.
